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I. INTRODUCTION 
The  founding  f~thers of  the  European  Economic  Community  placed 
the  abolition of  obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  capital  among  the 
main  tasks  of  the  new  venture  (art. 3), along  with  such  fundamental 
aims  as  the  elimination of  trade  restrictions,  the  establishment  of 
a  common  customs  tariff, the  free  movement  of  persons  and  services, 
the  adoption  of  a  common  agricultural  policy and  the  establishment  of 
a  European  Investment Bank. 
While  many  of  these  aims  have  been  broadly attained,  the  creation 
of  a  genuinely  integrated  European  capital  market  still  remains  a 
distant  goal.  After  an  initial  spate of  liberalising activism  in  the 
early sixties,  no  further  progre?s  has  been  recorded.  On  the  contrary, 
national  restrictions  have  been  reintroduced  in  several  countries,  and 
there  is  today  a  marked  divergence  in  the degree  of  liberalisation pre-
vailing  in  the  Community  Member  States.  Instead of  the  development  of 
an  integrated  European  capital  market,  we  have  witnessed  the  remarkable 
growth  of  a  parallel  and  unregulated  world-wide  financial  market,  the 
so-called  Euromarket. 
This  situation is  usually deplored either on  almost  moral  grounds, 
with  much  waving  of  fingers  at  those  countries  who  have  sinned,  or  on 
narrowly  legal  ones,  with  lengthy quotations  from  the  Treaty and  other 
Community  texts.  While  the  failure  to build an  integrated  European 
capital  market  is certainly  lamentable,  it  raises  questions  going  beyond 
mere  indignation.  Why  has  this  goal,  contrary to others,  not  been  achieved? 
Is it simply by  accident?  Or  is there  a  basic  economic  or other  reason 
explaining  it?  Has  the  goal  become  obsolete,  being  surpassed  by  wider 
developments  on  a  world  scale,  and/or  being  undermined  by  continuing 
national  desires  to  preserve  control  over  domestic  markets?  Or  was  there 
from  the  very  beginning  some  inconsistency  among  the  various  Community 
goals? 
...  / ... ··:1. 
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These  are  the  questions  I  intend  to address.  To  this  end,  I  shall, 
as  a  first step,  throw  a  spotlight  on  the  period  .. where  it all started": 
the  early sixties.  After  that  first  section,  the  complementary  second 
piece  of  analysis  has  to  deal  with  the  situation  today,  i.e.  the  early 
eighties.  The  comparison  should  bring  out  the  change  in  our  environment 
during  the  past  two  decades:  the  evolution  in markets,  institutions, 
theories  and  (maybe)  policy principles  pertinent  to  a  European  capital 
market  policy.  Finally,  I  will  attempt  to  look  ahead  and  to derive  some 
policy  conclusions  on  capital  market  liberalisation and  restriction in 
the  Community. 
I.  THE  EARLY  SIXTIES 
1.  Legal  framework 
Article 67  of  the Treaty of  Rome  provides  that  " •••  Member 
States  shall progressively abolish  between  themselves  all  restrictions 
on  the  movement  of  capital~'  •••  "to the  extent  necessary  to  ensure 
the  proper  functioning  of  the  common  market  ••• ".  And  the  Council 
was  called upon,  in article 69,  to  " •••  issue  the  necessary directives 
for  the  progressive  implementation"  of  this provision. 
The  Council  was  then  remarkably  rapid  in  its response:  it adopted 
a  first directive  in  1960  and  a  second  in  1962,  graduating  the  free-
dom  of  capital  movements  according  to  the differing nature  of  the 
flows  concerned,  ranging  from  direct  investments,  to  financial 
placements  of  various  maturities,  to purely  short-term  and  potentially 
speculative  flows,  etc.  Member  States  were  thus  unconditionally 
obliged  to  fully  liberalise movements  of  capital directly  connected 
with  the  flow  of  goods  and  services  (e.g.  for  direct  investments, 
~ 
investments  in  real estate,  commercial  credits), of  personal  capital, 
of  securities  quoted  on  the  stock  exchange  (lists A and  8).  In 
another  category,  "conditional"  liberalisation  was  envisaged  for  the 
issuing  of  bonds  and  for  capital  flows  with  purely financing  purposes 
•••  I ..• 3. 
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such  as  longer-term  financing  loans  (list  C).  Liberalisation  remained 
non-compulsory  for  short-term  financing  loans  and  new  foreign  bank 
(l .  D)  1)  accounts  1st 
The  basic  philosophy  underlying  these  initial  successes  on  the 
road  to  liberalisation was  clear  enough.  Its most  comprehensive  ex-
pression  is to be  found  in  the  well-known  report  on  the  formation  of 
a  European  capital  market,  drawn  up  in  1966  by  a  group  of  experts 
chaired  by  Professor  Claudio  Segre  2)  This  study,  which  has  become 
a  Community  classic  in  its own  right,  argued  that  a  European-wide 
capital  market  would  become  increasingly necessary,  not  only to 
better finance  economic  growth,  but  also to  stimulate  the  implementation 
of  Community  policies  in other  ~reas.  In particular, a  European  capital 
market  was  considered  a  necessary  precondition  to  economic  and  monetary 
union  within  the  Community,  contributing  to  a  smooth  functioning  of  an 
international  monetary  system  based  on  fixed  exchange  rates  and  com-
pl·etely  liberalised foreign  exchange  transactions. 
These  ideas,  hopes  and  initial  realisations  were  tacitly 
founded  on  the  existence of  fixed  exchange  rates.  Such  a  regime, 
• •.  I ••• 
1)  The  p~oblem of  short-term  capital  movements  and  their control  has 
occupied  a  central  place  in  international  economics  during  recent 
years,  and  has  been  covered  extensively  in  economic  and  theoretical 
literature.  Suffice it here  to draw  attention to  the  important 
distinction to  be  made  between  controls affecting  long-term  and 
short-term capital  movements;  this  is  in  fact  reflected  in  the 
different  treatment  accorded  them  in  the first  two  Cduncil 
directives,  as  well  as  in  the  IMF  Articles  of  Agreement  and  in the 
OECD  Code  of  liberalisation of  capital  movements. 
2)  "Le  developpement  d'un  marche  europeen  des  capitaux",  Commission 
des  Communautes  europeennes,  Brussels,  November  1966. ·----------- -------
provided  by  the Bretton  Woods  arrangements after the end  of  World 
War  II, seemed  so  natural  a  component  of  an  envisaged  common  market, 
that  nobody  bothered  to  write it down  explicitly in  the Treaty. 
4. 
This  insight  is  important,  as  the  presumption  of  fixed  exchange  rates 
has  been  a  potential  source  of  early  inconsistencies  in  the overall 
conception of  EEC  stabilisation policies.  I  shall  return  to this 
matter  in  more  detail  later. 
2.  Facts 
To  understand  the  force  of  conviction  carried  by  arguments  such 
as  those  of  the  Segre  report  and  to  realise  why  those  initial  successes 
were  blocked  in  the  late sixties and  finally  reversed  in the  course of 
the  seventies,  one  needs  to  trace the  factual  background  to those 
events. 
The  first  element  relates to  the  broad  historical  perspective 
the  lessons  of  the  Great  Depression  - when  many  countries  attempted 
to maintain  employment  through  competitive devaluations  and  resort  to 
exchange  and  trade  restrictions - were  deeply  engraved  in  the  m~nds 
of post-war  policy makers.  The  Bretton  Woods  agreement,  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations,  and  especially the  Rome  Treaty  reflect  a  keen 
awareness  of  interdependence,  a  strong political  will  to further  inte-
gration  and  cooperation,  and  a  widening  acceptance of  the  need  for  an 
agreed  code  of  conduct  in  international  trade  and  financial  matters. 
There  was  a  deep  recognition  of  the  self-defeating nature  of  "beggar-
thy-neighbour" policies and  of  their  contribution  to  lower  global 
employment  and  welfare. 
Secondly,  the  interpenetration of  financial  markets  and  the 
degree  of  openness  of  the  industrial  economies  were  much  lower  than 
they  are  today,  so  that  policy makers  were  less  fearful  of  uncontroll-
able  exogenous  developments  impinging  on  their domestic  autonomy. 
As  regards  the  financial  markets,  for  example,  longer-run  net  private 
capital  flows  (over  one  year)  within  the  Community  totalled under 
•• • I ••• -------------------------------------------------------------·· 
1  billion dollars  in 1960,  while  "classical" foreign  bonds  issued 
within  the  EEC  amounted  to only  200  million dollars  (1961) 1).  The 
Euromarkets  were,  for  their part,  just beginning  to  see  the  light 
of day.  On  the "real" side of  the picture,  the  major  European 
economies  were  much  less  open  than  they are  today:  measuring 
openness  by  the  ratio of  total  exports  to  GDP,  in  1960  this  ranged 
from  12  per  cent  in  Italy  (against  25  per  cent  today),  14  per  cent 
5. 
2)  in  France  (22  per  cent)  and  18  per  cent  in Germany  (30  per  cent)  • 
Thirdly  and  finally,  the  general  economic  climate of  the 
late fifties and  early sixties was  also propitious to  a  process  of 
relatively harmonious  and  shock-free  integration.  This  was  a  period 
of  steady,  non-inflationary  growth,  of  easy  labour  supply  and  mo-
bility, of  low  and  declining  energy  and  raw  material  costs, of 
asynchronous  and  compensating  cycles  among  the  major  industrial 
countries  :  all  factors  favouring  a  generally  convergent  economic 
performance  and  a  reduction  of  per  capita  income  disparities among 
the  original  six  members  of  the  Community.  In this  environment,  the 
dismantling  of  capital  controls  seemed  to  lie in the mainstream  of 
developments  and  to  be  in  the  natural  order  of  things. 
Having  thus  described  the  legal  and  the  factual  background  to 
the  events  of  the early sixties,  I  would  like  to  sketch  out  their 
broader  implications for  economic  policy,  having  recourse  to the 
conventional  economic  wisdom  prevailing  in those early days  after 
the  Treaty of  Rome. 
3.  Policy analysis 
Open  economy  macro-economics  prevailing  in  the early sixties 
focussed  on  "insular",  i.e. basically  independent  national  economies 
and  governments.  Between  any  two  countries,  a  real  and  a  financial 
relationship  was  suggested  to  hold  in  the  case  of  fixed  exchange  rates  • 
• • • I ••• 
1)  Source  Segr~ Report,  op.cit., Statistical Annex,  tables  13  and  15. 
2)  Source  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  Directorate-
General  for  Ec·onomic  and  Financial  Affairs- "European  Economy", 
n°  10,  November  1981,  and  "Economic  Forecasts  1982-1983",  May-
June  1982. 6. 
The  "real"  relationship  linked  domestic  policies to the  trade 
balance  :  if a  national  government  conducted  expansive policies, the 
trade  balance  would  worsen  via  increased domestic  spending  on  im-
ported  goods.  The  "financial"  relationship maintained  that  inter-
national  capital  flows  react  to  interest  rate differentials  :  an  in-
crease  in  (nominal)  interest  rates  in  a  given  country  would  raise 
capital  inflows,  thereby  improving  the  capital  account. 
The  analytical combination  of these  two  relationships 
demon~trated how  international  ilows of.financiil  capital fit 
into national  stabilisation-policies.  Take  for  example 
the  case of  a  slowdown  in  economic  activity.  A policy of  budgetary 
expansion  would  then  stimulate the  economy,  while  restricting monetary 
policy  would  keep  domestic  interest  rates  high  enough  to attract 
capital  inflows.  Overall  balance  of  payments  equilibrium  would  be 
maintained,  as  the  trade deficit  would  be  financed  by  interest-sensi-
tive capital  inflows  from  abroad.  The  result  is a  policy mix  in  which 
. 
monetary  policy  is not  directed  towards  domestic  goals,  and  becomes, 
rather,  a  tool  for  balance  of  payments  financing,  working  via  the 
interest-sensitivity of  international  capital  flows. 
Thus,  the  economic  wisdom  of  the  early sixties  suggested  that, 
in  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  without  capital  controls,  there  is  in 
principle  no  room  for  an  independent  national  policy mix.  In particular, 
monetary  policy is constrained to be  used  as  a  tool  for  external  sta-
bilisation.  This  consequence  follows  from  the  coexistence of  free 
capital  flows  and  fixed  exchange  rates. 
Both  these~elements were,  however,  built  into  the  Treaty of 
Rome,  as  mentioned  before.  Free  capital  flows  were  explicitly  con-
sidered as  an  objective.  Fixed  exchange  rates  were  an  implicit pillar 
of  the  Treaty.  It  should  follow  that  the  use  of  monetary  policy  for 
domestic  purposes  is  ruled  out,  i.e.  that  national  monetary  policies 
are to  be  constrained  ~Y balance  of  payments  considerations.  We  cannot 
•••  I ••• • 
7. 
aim  simultaneously at  1)  free trade,  2)  capital  mobility,  3)  inde-
pendent  domestic  monetary  policy  and  4)  fixed  exchange  rates.  The 
circle  cannot  be  squared:  one  element  has  to be  surrendered  in  order 
to  avoid  any  inconsistency.  The  incompatibility between  fixed  ex-
change  rates,  free  capital  movements  and  independent  national  monetary 
policies  has  been  referred  to  in  economic  literature as  the  "incon-
sistent trinity".  To  this trio  we  have  added  a  fourth  element,  that 
of  free  trade,  which  is  a  pillar of  the  Rome  Treaty and  an  aspect 
which  cannot  simply be  taken  for  granted  in our present  economic 
environment.  As  Henry  C.  Wallich  has  observed,  the  incompatibility 
of  these  elements  is  "a  fact  well  known  to  economists  but  never 
recognised  in  our  institutional arrangements  or  avowed  principles 
of  national  policy" 1). 
Given  the Treaty's explicit  provision  for  the  free  flow  of 
goods,  services  and  capital,  the  choices  open  were  to  give  up  either 
the  autonomy  of  domestic  monetary  policy or  the  system  of  fixed  ex-
change  rates.  The  latter option being  hardly  conceivable  at  the 
time,  the  Community's  founding  fathers  made  a  definite  choice  in 
favour  of  the  coordination  of policies,  overcoming  the  incompatibility of 
the various  objectives  by  indicating that  in  the  "inconsistent quartet" 
it is the  autonomy  of  national policies  which  will  have  to  yield to 
the  exigencies  of  coordination,  so  that  fixed  exchange  rates,  free 
capital  flows  and  free  trade  may  coexist.  There  are  a  number  of 
articles  in  the  Treaty bearing this out:  art.  145,  in  particular, 
sets  the  task of  ensuring the  "coordination of  the  general  economic 
policies  of  the  Member  States" alongside  "the  power  to  take decisions" 
as  one  of  the  two  fundamental  Council  tools  for  the  attainment  of  the 
•• • I ••• 
1)  Henry  C.  Wallich  - "The  monetary  crisis of  1971  - The  lessons  to  be 
learned",  The  Per  Jacobsson  Foundation,  24  September  1972,  Washing-
ton  D.C.  A similar  dilemma  faced  the  Bretton  Woods  negotiators. 
They  solved  it by  agreeing  that  members  of  the  IMF  should  be  able  to 
control  capital  transfers  (except  for  current  transactions).  Already 
in  his  Proposals  for  an  International  Clearing  Union,  issued  in  1943, 
Keynes  had  declared  that  no  country  could  safely permit  unwanted 
movements  of  fugitive  funds,  for  which  reason  it  was  "widelY.  held 
that  control  of  capital  movements,  both  inward  and  outward,  should 
be  a  permanent  feature  of  the  post-war  system".  See  Joseph  Gold  -
"International  capital  movements  under  the  Law  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund",  IMF  Pamphlet  Series  No.  21,  Washington  D.C.,  1977. 8. 
Treaty's objectives.  The  fact  that  in a  regime  of  fixed  exchange 
rates  and  free  capital  movements,  economic  policy is necessarily 
constrained  by  external  considerations  is furthermore  recognised 
in art.  104  :  "Each  Member  State shall  pursue  the  economic  policy 
needed  to ensure  the equilibrium  of  its overall  balance  of  pay-
ments  and  to maintain  confidence  in its currency  ••• 
II 
The  analytical  foundations  of  the  Treaty are  therefore 
sound  and  conceptually  consistent  :  the  subsequent  inconsistency 
and  related difficulties have-arisen  because  the  principle of 
economic  policy  coordination,  enounced  in  the  Treaty,  has  remained 
precisely only  a  princ~ple.  Its practical  implementation  continues 
to  rest  on  extremely  loose  and  largely  ineffective arrangements, 
so  that  coordination  remains  without  "bite", at  times  degenerating 
into a  mere  exchange  of  information  on  policy actions decided  upon 
unilaterally.  That.is the  main  short-coming  and  the  root  of  the 
problem  :  the  Treaty set  coordination as  a  finality  and  an 
objective,  but  failed  to provide  for  implemental  norms  and  concrete 
instruments  to  render  it a  reality. 
• ••  I ••• 
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II.  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES 
1.  Legal  framework 
The  two  Council  directives of  1960  and  1962  marked  the  last 
progress  so  far  achieved  towards  the  liberalisation of  capital  move-
ments.  Since  then  there  has  in fact  been  a  retreat.  A third 
directive,  aimin~ at  a  stepwise  further  liberalisation,  was  submitted 
by  the  Commission  in  1967,  but  had  to be  withdrawn  after ten  years 
of  fruitless  negotiations at  Council  level.  A decision  is still  pen~ 
ding  on  a  more  recent  proposal  (1979)  to  broaden directly the  scope 
of  the first directive  (inclusion of  investment  fund  certificates>. 
To  be  sure,  there  have  been other directives  with  some,  albeit 
indirect,  bearing  on  our  subject  :  as  bankers  you  are all  certainly 
familiar  with  the  1973  directive on  financial  institutions  (freedom 
of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services)  and  with  the  1977 
directive  relating to the-taking  up  and  pursuit  of  the  business  of 
credit  institutions.  There  have  also been  directives on  insurances, 
and  two  directives  (in 1979  and  1980)  on  the admission  of  securities 
to official  stock  exchange  listing  and  stating the  particulars to be 
published  for  such  admission. 
These  measures  are of  undoubted  indirect  significance for  our 
subject  matter,  insofar as  capital  market  integration  requires  a 
harmonisation  of  regulations  and  institutional  structures.  But  as 
regards  the  main  stage of  direct  capital  movements  liberalisation, 
the  account  remains  negative.  The  overall  degree  of  liberalisation 
is  lower  today  than  in  the early sixties, and  differs  widely  as 
between  Community  countries. 
The  existing  imbalance  in  the degree  of  liberalisation may  be 
briefly illustrated as  follows.  There  are  no  restrictions on  inter-
national  flows  of  financial  capital  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  (apart 
from  marginal  heritages  from  the  past)  in Germany  and  the Netherlands. 
The  obstacle of  additional  transaction  costs  in  the  form  of  a  two-tier 
foreign  exchange  market  exists  in Belgium/Luxembourg  and  in  France • 
• • • I ••• 10~ 
Direct  restrictions on  capital  flows,  which  were  formerly  liberalised 
under  the first  two  Community  directives,  have  been  imposed  since 
1968  in  France,  since 1974  in  Italy,  and  since 1978  in  Denmark  and 
Ireland.  These  restrictive measures  were  authorised  by  the  Commission, 
under  recourse  to the  "safeguard  clauses"  laid down  in  the  Treaty of 
Rome,  whereby  Member  States  may  be  authorised to take protective 
measures  when  "movements  of  capital  lead  to disturbances  in  the 
functioning  of  the  capital  market"  (art.  73)  or  "where  a  Member  State 
is  in difficulties or  is seriously  threatened  with  difficulties as 
regards  its balance of  payments"  (art.  108). 
The  Italian  requirement  to deposit  50  per  cent  of  financial 
investment  abroad  in a  non-interest  bearing,  domestic  bank  account 
is one  example  of  a  continuously existing  long-term  restriction;  the 
French  recourse  to safeguard  clauses  to  control  various  operations 
is another. 
To  do  justice to  the "restrictive" countries,  it should  be 
added  that  the various· obstacles are diversified  in  such  a  way  that 
some  types  of  capital  flows  are  less  restricted than others.  In  the 
Italian case,  for  example,  the deposit  requirement  does  not  apply  to 
direct  investments  in  EEC  countries.  In  Denmark  and  Ireland,  the 
restrictions do  not  apply  to  the acquisition of  securities  issued 
by  Community  institutions. 
This  listing of details  could  continue,  but  for our present 
purposes,  it suffices  to state the  fact  that  the degree  of  Libera-
lisation is markedly  imbalanced  across  the  Community  and  generally 
less  than  twenty  years  ago.  We  face  the existence of protracted 
long-term  controls  on  capital  flows  - controls  which  were  originally 
authorised  on  a  transitory,  short-term basis only,  consistent  with 
the  rationale of  the "safeguard  clauses". 
. ..  !,  •• 
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One  may  finally add  two  critical  remarks  on  the  legal  frame-
work  within  which  capital  movement  liberalisation may  be  enacted 
in  the  Community. 
Firstly, Uberalisation of  capital  flows  in  the  Community  con-
tinues  to depend,  from  a  legal  point  of  view,  solely on  directives 
issued  on  the basis of article 69  of  the Treaty.  This  is to  say  that 
even  today,  after. the  end  of  a  Long  'transitional period'  for  the 
Community,  the  general  principle of  free  capital  flows  (art.  67) 
does  not  constitute,  by  itself, directly binding  Law.  This  clari-
fication  has  been  given  recently,  and  for  the first  time,  by  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  (Casati  case, decision  of  11  November  1981). 
Hence,  the  Legal  framework  i~ one  which  obliges  us  to  continue along 
the  troublesome  road  of  issuing directives,  building  European  capital 
market  intergration step  by  step. 
This  approach  is,  secondly,  troublesome  in another  way.  There  is 
the  serious drawback  of  very  Long  internal  decision  Lags  within  the 
Community  itself •.  The  time  seems  to be  gone  when  it took  the  Council 
only  a  few  months  to  approve  a  proposal  put  forward  by  the  Commission, 
as  was  the  case  with  the first  two  directives  in  1960  and  1962. 
Today,  we  sometimes  have  to  wait  for  years  until  a  proposal  by  the 
Commission  gets  Council  approval,  if any  (as  illustrated by  the 
table on  the  following  page). 
To  the  lag  in  the  internal  decision-making process,  one  must 
furthermore add- once  approved  by  the  Council -the very  Long  imple-
mentation delays  and/or  grace  periods  granted.  You  are undoubtedly 
familiar  with  the  considerable  time it took  certain Member  States to 
apply  the  1973  directive on  the  freedom  of  establishment  and  the 
freedom  to  provide  services  of  financial  institutions,  risking  the 
initiation of  formal  proceedings  against  the  countries  concerned • 
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INTERNAL  LAG  OF  COMMUNITY  DIRECTIVES  ON  CAPITAL  MARKETS 
AND  RELATED  ISSUES 
year  of 
Directive  (subject) 
Commission  Council  Decision  - Proposal  Approval  Lag 
First  Directive on  Article 67 
of  the  Treaty  1960  1960  2  months 
Second  Directive on  Article 67  1962  1962  7  months 
Third  Directive on  Article 67  1967  withdrawn  (120 months)• 
•  in 1977 
Directive on  financial  insti-
tutions  1965  1973  95  months 
Directive on  international 
capital  flows  and  domestic  1971  1972  9  months 
Liquidity 
Directive on  conditions  of 
stock  exchange  admission  1976  1979  38  months 
Directive on  contents of 
prospectus to be  published  1972  1980  90  months 
First  coordination directive 
on  financial  services  1974  1977  36  months 
...  ! ... ·-------·---· 
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2.  Facts 
Let  me  now  turn  to  the  factual  background  to the present  situ-
ation,  Looking  in turn at  the  financial,  real  and  policy phenomena  of 
the  early eighties. 
(i)  The  EEC-scenario  of  detailed  regulations  applied  to  some 
national  capital ~arkets contrasts  sharply  with  the  existence of 
international  financial  markets  which  are global  and  mobile  in  scope, 
not  subject  to official  regulations  and  ever  growing  in  volume 
1) 
Against  this  background  the  continued  existence of nationally  regu-
Lated  capital  markets  in  the  Community  appears  somewhat  anachronistic. 
This  impression  is intensified,  if  we  acknowledge  that  the  very fail-
ure  to build  a  European  capital  market  was  one  of  the  reasons  for 
Euromarkets  to  come  into existence  :  the  absence  of  a  liberalised and 
integrated official capital  market  within  the  Community  constituted 
a  vacuum  which  was  filled by private activities,  with  the  informal 
construction of  a  free  and  integrated  capital  market  outside the 
Community.  There  is  some  analogy  here  with  the  way  in  which  US 
multinationals  have  been  able to  take  advantage  of  the opportunities 
offered  by  the  Common  Market  more  fully  and  better than most  European 
firms. 
Cii)  The  golden  period  of  steady,  non-inflationary  growth  which 
accompanied  our  first  liberalisation successes  has  been  followed  by 
one  of  poor  growth,  price  and  employment  performance  throughout  the 
industrialised  world  2) 
•• • I •• • 
1)  See  Table  in  Annex  for  figures  on  the  growth  of  these markets. 
2)  See  Table  in  Annex  for  some  indicators  comparing  performance  in 
the  early  eightie~ to  that  achieved  in  the  early  sixties. 14. 
More  importantly for  the  subject  at  hand  is that  the  structural 
imbalances  in  the balance of  payments  situation of  the  major  country 
groupings,  and  particularly the persistence of  a  large deficit  for  the 
non-oil  developing  countries,  continues  to mean  a  sustained  need  for 
financing,  i.e. for  compensating  int~rnational capital  flows,  giving 
an  essential  role  to  international  financial  markets  as  "recycling 
vehicles".  Let  me  just  mention  that  in 1981  OECD  countries  raised 
medium  and  long  term  loans  on  the  Euromarkets  in the order of  magni-
tude  of  100  billion dollars;  adding  the  35  billion dollars  raised  by 
OECD  countries  in  the  form  of  international  bond  issues,  one  arrives 
at  a  total  of  135  billion dollars  which  surpasses  by  far  the  current 
account  deficit  of  OECD  countries  in  the  same  year  (29  billion 
dollars).  This  demonstrates,  in  general,  a  saving-investment  disso-
ciation at  an  international  (global)  level.  Again,  a  large  need  for 
international  capital  mobility  is the  consequence. 
To  complete  the  list of  relevant  facts,  let  me  point  to a 
policy feature  which  is closely  related  to  the financial  and  real 
features  mentioned  so  far,  and  which  may  bring  us  back  to a  more  spe-
cifically EEC  dimension. 
(iii)  In  a  world  of  generally floating  exchange  rates,  there exists, 
since March  1979,  the  currency area  of  the  European  Monetary  System 
(EMS)  with  fixed  (but  adjustable)  exchange  rates.  Obviously,  there 
is a  contrast  between  the  EMS,  which  provides  free  convertibility of 
European  currencies within  fixed  exchange  rate margins,  and  the 
continued  existence of  nationally  regulated  European  capital markets. 
In  other words,  while  the  "short  end"  of  financial  capital  trans-
actions,  the  money  markets,  are tied together  and  integrated by  means 
of  the  EMS,the  longer  term  end  of  European  capital  markets,  comprising 
long-term  loans  as  well  as  the  issue  and  circulation of  securities, 
is still segmented.  The  policy dimension  of  the  EMS  relates precisely 
•••  I ••• ·· .. : 
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to this  contrast  with  the existence of  regulated  capital  markets. 
3.  Policy analysis 
Theoretical  developments  as  well  as  factual  experience  have 
modified  in an  important  way  the analysis of  "insular" economies, 
outlined above  for  the early sixties.  It  is now  clear that  in a 
world  of  capital mobility  full  insulation  from  external  influences 
1) 
is impossible,  even  with  floating  exchange  rates 
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  the  following  Line  of  reasoning. 
The  main  fundamental  determinants  of  exchange  rates,  that  is relative 
cost  and  price developments  and  balance  of  payments  positions,  operate 
consistently  in  the  Long-run  only.  In  the  short-run,  exchange  rates 
may  be  pushed  in different directions,  away  from  their fundamental 
equilibrium  Level,  by  rapidly  changing  expectations  influenced  by  a 
variety of  factors.  Recent  analysis of  exchange  rate determination 
_.:. 
has  explained  the  frequent  overshooting  of  the  equilibrium  Level 
(defined  by  purchasing  power  parity or  by  other underlying  determinants) 
by  treating  exchange  rates  as  financial  asset  prices,  i.e. prices 
which  are  determined  in  the  short  term  by  portfolio adjustments  in the 
assets  markets  and  are  thus  closely  influenced  by  often unstable 
expectations  2).  Short-run  changes  in  exchange  rates  are  thus  brought 
about  by  massive  flows  of  short-run financial  capital, generated  by 
and  transmitted  via  efficient  international  financial  markets • 
• • • I ••• 
1)  See,  for  example,  J.  Tobin  and  J.  Braga  de  Macedo  - "The  short-
run  macro-economics  of  floating  exchange  rates  :  an  exposition", 
Cowles  Foundation  discussion paper  n°  522,  New  Haven,  April  1979. 
2)  For  various  versions  of  the asset  market  approach  to exchange  rate 
determination,  see  the  'Scandinavian Journal  of  Economics',  vol.  38, 
no  2,  1976. 16 •. 
The  deviation  of  exchange  rates  from  their  "normal"  level, 
i.e.  their over- or  undershooting,  has  important  real  effects on 
domestic  economic  activity- on  domestic  industries,  on  export 
and  import-competing  sectors.  It  follows  from  this  reasoning  that 
national  authorities of  widely  open  economies  cannot  afford a 'benign 
neglect'  as  regards  their exchange  rate. 
Their  reaction varies according  to their possibilities  : 
returning  to  our  "inconsistent  quartet",  Community  member  countries 
have  dealt  with  the policy dilemma  it  involves  by  adopting differ-
ent  combinations  and  yielding  on  one  or more  of  the  various  fronts. 
In  very  general  terms  the  situation  could  be  described  as  follows 
the  sm·a ller open  economies,  such  as  the  Benelux  countries,  have 
sacrificed the  independence  of  their domestic  monetary  policy on  the 
altar of  exchange  rate stability and  free  capital  flows.  On  the 
other  hand,  France  and  Italy have  broadly  aimed  at  insutating their 
domestic  m6netary  polic~ and  at  maintaining  their  currencies'  exchange 
rate  via  the  use  of  capital  controls  (and  other direct  controls,  such 
as  credit  ceilings).  The  United  Kingdom  did  not  join  the  EMS  because, 
inter alia, it felt  that  an  exchange  rate  commit~ent  was  incompatible 
with  the  Lifting of  exchange  controls  and  the  pursuit  of  quantitative 
monetary  targets,  to which  it gave  priority. 
One  could object  that  Germany,  at  least,  has  in  some  measure 
succeeded  in  squaring  the  circle  :  to  the  extent  that  this may  be  true, 
it  is obviously due  to  its pivotal  position  in  determining  monetary 
conditions  in  the  Community  as  a  whole.  But  if one  enlarges  one's 
horizon  beyond  the  confines  of  the  Community,  one  only  needs  to  Look 
at  developments  over  the  Last  decade  to  realise the  ~xtent to  which 
even  Germany  had,  firstly,  recourse  to  capital  controls  (special 
minimum  reserve  requirements,  cash  deposit  requirements,  Limitations 
on  the  sale of  domestic  fixed-interest  securities to non-residents) 
•• •. 1 ••• 17. 
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in  the early seventies  and,  in  more  recent  times,  has  had  to 
design  its monetary  policy  in  the  light  of  external  considerations; 
in  the  words  of  its own  monetary  authorities  :  "During  the  year  under 
review  (1981)  the  Bundesbank  was  unable  to  take  as  much  account  as 
in previous  years  of  domestic  economic  problems  (which  it always  kept 
very  much  in mind)  in  its policies,'which  had  to  be  oriented  more 
d  l  .  .  "  2)  I  th  .  towar  s  externa  requ1rements  at  t1mes  n  e  present  lnter-
national  monetary  system,  an  effectively  independent  monetary  policy 
is feasible  only  in  what  could  be  termed  the  n-th  currency  country, 
i.e.  the  United  States. 
III.  LOOKING  AHEAD  POLICY  APPROACHES 
In  order  to  reassess  European  capital  markets  policy,  the 
picture of  a  changed  economic  environment  should  now  be  completed 
with  an  attempt  to  look  ~head.  The  comparison  of  the  early eighties 
with  the  early  sixties  reveals  the  persistence of  the  old  problem 
in a  new  environment  :  we  still have  to  reconcile  the  four  elements 
of  free  trade,  exchange  rate discipline,  capital  mobility and  national 
policy autonomy.  The  problem,  and  the  whole  question  of  capital  market 
liberalisation  in  the  Community,  has  to be  tackled  on  the  basis of  a 
consistent,  and  Community-oriented,  organisation of all  these  four 
elements.  We  may  think  of  trad~ money,  control  and  policy  as  consti-
tuting  the  four  rings  of  what  must  be  a  coherent  and  organised  chain, 
and  we  may  distil  three  policy  approaches  which  could  alternatively 
•.•  I ... 
1)  Causing  the  German  Expert  Council  to  remark  that  "in  restricting 
international  capital  movements,  the  Federal  Republic  has  embarked 
on  a  path  which  will  lead  us  away  from  a  European  monetary  union". 
Quoted  in  N.  Walter  - "Capital  controls  and  the autonomy  of 
national  demand  management  :  the  German  case",  in  Alexander  K. 
Swoboda,  ed.  - "Capital  movements  and  their  control",  Geneva  1976, 
p.  170. 
2)  See  "Report  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  for  the  year  1981", · 
Frankfurt,  April 1982,  p.1. 18. 
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bring  about  full  consistency between  th~ four  rings  of  the  chain. 
We  will  describe  them  briefly,  in their pure  and  conceptual  form, 
i.e.  for  clarity of  exposition,  we  will  intentionally  ignore  the 
existence of political difficulties and  the  constraints  of  gradualism.' 
1.  Follow  consistent  macro-policies. 
If  each  member  country  followed  a  policy  line  consistent  with 
that  of  its partners and  oriented to  commonly  agreed  objectives,  no 
tensions  would  develop  in  the  chain.  Thus  "policy coordination"  looks 
like the  road  of  wisdom  and  simplicity.  So  much  so  that,  starting with 
the  Treaty,  a  little library of  Community  texts  has  legislated  in de-
tail  the  procedures  by·which  groups,  committees  and  councils  of  experts, 
officials,  central  bankers  and  ministers  should  reach  ex-ante  consistency, 
as  if one  policy  were  followed  in  the  whole  of  the area.  In  the 
Commission  in Brussels  we  spend  the  best  of  our skills and  efforts  to 
maximise  the  effectivenes~ .of  coordination.  And  it is perhaps  just 
because ·of ·that,  that  we  are  very  familiar  with  the  formidable  limits 
of  this  exercise  :  what  appears  to  be  the  road  of  wisdom  and  simplicity 
is,  in  many  ways,  the  road  of  simplification and  deception. 
Complete  and  systematic  consistency  of  macro-policies  conducted 
by  a  group  of  sovereign  governments  is extremely difficult  for  a 
variety of  reasons.  Each  government  ultimately  responds  to  its own 
electorate  :  there  is little probability,  and  we  have  evidence  of  this 
every year,  that  voters  of different  countries  vote  for  the  same  policies 
at  the  same  time.  In  addition,policy  calendars  do  not  coincide  :  budget 
proposals  for  a  given  year  are presented at  very different points  of 
time  in ~ifferent countries;  not  even  the definitions of  a  fiscal  year 
coincide.  For  monetary  policy difficulties are also great,  as  they  con-
cern  not  only  calendar,  but  also  choice  of  targets,  choice of  instruments, 
structures of  the  banking  industry and  financial  intermediaries  in  ge-
neral.  Finally,  polifY mixes  are  shaped  in  very different  ways  according 
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not  only to  choice  but  also to the  institutional  relationships  between 
national  central  banks  and  Treasuries.  And  more  reasons  could  be  given. 
Complete  and  systematic  consistency of policies achieved  without 
any  institutional  infra-structure is a  dream,  a  beautiful  and  dan-
gerous  one  like  the  anarchic  dream  of  universal  love  and  altruism.  On 
the other  hand,  to create an  international  infra-structure that  would 
force  the  dream  into reality would  raisa.Anormous difficulties, much 
greater difficulties and  objections  than  those  raised by  more  limited 
institutional  steps  in  the  areas  of  capital  market  or  monetary  integra-
tion. 
To  the  extent  to  which  coordination  does  not  work,  or at  best, 
in  the  words  of  J.  J.  Polak,  is only  "a  relatively weak  form  of  inter-
.  l  .  f l  .  l  l"  .  II  1)  h  d. ff  f  f  nat1ona  1n  uence  on  nat1ona  po  1c1es  ,  we  ave  1  erent  orms  o 
distortions  in  the other  rings  of  the  chain.  One  of  them  is  the  develop-
ment  of  various  types  of.controls,  possibly of  capital  market  controls, 
as  we  have  already  seen.  Another  is, of  course,  the  widening  of  eco-
nomic  divergences  that  create  tensions  in  the  EMS  and  threaten 
trade  and  agricultural  arrangements,  thus  endangering  the  very  found-
ations of  the  Community.  In other  words,  if the  policy  coordination 
ring  in  our  chain  of  four  elements  does  not  hold,  at  least  one  of  the 
other  elements  is  bound  to  come  under  tension  and  perhaps  break  : 
trade,  money  or  controls. 
To  prevent  such  negative  consequences,  approaches  have  to  be 
implemented  which  tend  to  strengthen policy  coordination either 
indirectly, via  capital  market  integration, or directly,  via  the 
completion  of  monetary  union. 
• • • I ••• 
1)  See  J.  J.  Polak- "Coordination of  national  economic  policies", 
Group  of  Thirty Occasional  Papers  n°  7,  New  York,  1981. ··.'· 
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2.  Enforce  capital  market  integratio~ 
The  idea  conforms  closely  to  a  cooperative  Community  spirit, 
and  carries  the  logic  of  enforcing policy  coordination  in an  indirect 
way  through  the  institutionalisation, or organisation, of  a  European 
capital  market.  Detailed  proposals  to enact  further  liberalisation 
directives and  to  revitalise the  legally established  supervising 
functions  of  th~ Commission  and  the  Monetary  Committee  are its basic 
practical  ingredients. 
The  proposal  might  however  meet  with  the  objection that  the 
integration of  European  capital  markets  has  by  now  become  an  obsolete 
or  redundant  goal  :  financi~l markets  throughout  the  world  are already 
linked  via  the  Euromarkets,  which  have  repeatedly  proved  their worth 
as  efficient  vehicles  for  international  capital  mobility,  and  have 
in practice  raised  the  degree  of  integration between  different  money 
centres.  It  may  be  argued that  there are,  in  this  sense,  "market 
pressures"  towards  conformity  and  coordination,  as  observed  by 
Lindbeck  :  "The  internationalisation of  credit  markets  and  the 
integration of  governments  in  those  markets  as  reguLar  lenders  and 
borrowers,  as  well  as  the  increased  importance  of  market  forces  for 
exchange  rate determination,  mean  that  the  coordination of  government 
actions  is  increasingly brought  about  by  the  'invisible hand  of markets', 
1)  rather  than  by  the  more  visible hand  of  government  authorities" 
This  may  be  partially true,  but  it does  not  mean  that  the 
problem  of  government  action  in  terms  of  management  and  surveillance 
can  be  evaded  by  sole  reliance  on  market  forces.  This  is borne  out 
by  the  tendency  in all major  countries,  over  the  last  decade,  to 
increase the authorities'  regulatory and  supervisory powers,  in  many 
cases  enacting  far-reaching  legislation for  the first  time  since  the 
•• • I ••• 
1)  See  "International  coordination of  national  economic  policies", 
in  Samuel  I.  Katz,  ed.  - "US-European  monetary  relations", 
American  Enterprise Institute for  Public  Policy  Research, 
Washington  D.C.,  1977,  pp.  229-230. • 
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1930's  (another  crisis period),  and  by  the  attempts  to  increase  the 
transparency of  the  international  financial  markets,  which  have  tended 
to  grow  faster  than  the authorities'  ability to  supervise  them. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is th?t  money  and  financial  markets  "do 
not  manage  themselves"  :  to the  extent  to  which  there therefore  is a 
need  for  control  and  supervision,  the  question arises of  determining 
the  appropriate-space  over  which  they .should  be  exercised,  and  in  this 
regard  there  is  a  solid  case  for  operating  them  at  a  Community  level 
the  EEC  could  in  this  regard  be  seen  as  constituting an  optimum 
regulation  area.  This  would  be  certainly preferable to a  completely 
independent  use  of  controls  by  individual  member  countries,  which  may 
work  at  cross  purposes  and  invite  retaliation and  competitive  restric-
tive measures.  A rational  use  of  controls  based  on  Community  cooper-
ation  and  consultation  would  alleviate  such  difficulties  :  its intention 
would  not  be  to  extend  t~e area  of  government  regulations,  but  on  the 
contrary to forestall  conditions  leading  to  a  widespread  expansion of 
restrictions. 
The  Treaty  in  fact  advocates  a  Community  approach  of  this 
type  in article 70,  providing  for  "the progressive  coordination  of 
the  exchange  policies of  Member  States  in  respect  of  the  ~ovement of 
capital  between  those  states  and  third countries.  For  this purpose 
the  Council  shall  issue directives, acting  unanimously.  It  shall 
endeavour  to attain  the  highest  possible degree  of  liberalisation". 
This article is at  the  basis  of  the  1972  directive on  regulating 
international  capital  flows  and  neutralising their undesirable effects 
1)  on  domestic  liquidity 
•••  I ••• 
1)  This  directive,  approved  in  the  wake  of  the unsettling  events 
following  the  demise  of  the Bretton Woods  system  (and  to  respond 
particularly to the  formidable  1971  short-term  capital .inflows 
·to  Germany),  pruvided that  Mernbe9  States "adopt  measures  immediately 
in  order  io have  available,  should  occasion~ise, the  appropriate 
instruments  for  purpose  of  discouraging  exceptionally  large 
capital  movements,  in particular to and  from  third countries'', 
seen  to  cause  "serious disturbances  in  the  monetary  situation and 
in  the  economic  trends  in  Member  States",  likely to  "hinder  the 
establishment  by  stages of  an  economic  and  monetary  union". --
~ 
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The  implementation  of  this strategy does  however  encounter 
the difficulty of  being  a  very  "Legistation intensive" matter. 
There  are  not  only  extremely  Long  decision  Lags  within  the  Community, 
as  already mentioned.  More  importantly,  the  Legislative process  in 
the  EEC  is paralysed,  as  national  governments  are  increasingly 
absorbed  in  the  control  of  domestic  matters.  They  are more  and  more 
passive  and  immobile  in  building the  necessary  institutional arrange-
ments  to  conduct  systematic,  and  foreseeable,  Community-wide  policies 
in monetary  and  financial  matters.  Nevertheless,  stagnation might  be 
overcome,  if the political will  is there.  Hence,  this proposal  is a 
candidate to be  considered  seriously.  Its realisation  would  mean 
a  Large  step  towards  exploiting the  above-mentioned  potential  of  the 
EEC  as  an  optimum  regulation area. 
3.  Complete  monetary  union 
This  approach  is of  course  well-known  and  the  one  most  often 
attempted after the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  had  deprived 
the  Common  Market  of  the vital  monetary  organisation  required  for  its 
proper functioning.  It is therefore  not  necessary,  in  this  paper, 
to expound  on  it further.  Suffice it to  say  that  the  marked  attention 
and  many  studies devoted  to  the  question  of  European  monetary  union 
derive  from  the  realisation that  the  twin  goals  of  free  capital  move-
ments  and  fixed  exchange  rates  (explicit or  implicit  in  the  Treaty) 
imply  a  single  currency area  and  a  single monetary  authority.  Within 
a  single  country  - where  there are of  course  free  capital  flows  and 
a  single exchange  rate - it is clear that  "the various  branches  of 
the  central  bank  cannot  pursue  independent  monetary'policies.  The 
Federal  Reserve,  whose  twelve  regional  banks  were  established on  the 
contrary assumption,  learned  this early in  its career,  and  most  other 
central  banks  never  tried"  1> 
•• • I ••. 
1)  Henry  C.  Wallich,  op.  ci~., p.  7. -------·-------------------~~---~--. 
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Fully-fledged  European  monetary  union  is thus  the  high  road 
to policy  coordination  and  economic  convergence,  implementing  these 
directly by  replacing  a  number  of  monetary authorities  with  a  single, 
central  authority.  Its  realisationshoold  in practice be  easier  than 
the  capital  market  Liberalisation approach  :  it would  not  be  necessary 
to  overcome  a  multitude of  intricate, difficult obstacles and  regu-
Lations.  It  would  suffice to  realise one  major  achievement.:  monetary 
union.  Here  too,.its realisation  would  conform  to an  optimum  concept, 
i.e. that  of  the  Community  as  an  optimum  currency area. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In  conclusion,  where  do  we  in  the  Community  stand  today  as  bet-
ween  these three approaches  of  :  (1)  directly following  consistent  and 
coordinated policies;  or arriving at  such  policies  through  either  (2) 
capital  market  integration-or  (3)  monetary  union? ..  It  would 
seem  that  on  all  three fronts  we  are,  to a  Lesser  or  greater degree, 
'  . 
at  a  sort  of  halfway  house  between,  on  the  one  hand,  purely  national 
policy formation  and,  on  the other,  policy-making  that  is entirely 
Lodged  at  Community  Level.  It  is a  situation  in  which  the  Community  is 
still contending  with  the  problem  posed  by  the "inconsistent quartet" 
of  free  trade,  exchange  rate discipline,  free  capital  movements  and 
autonomous  domestic  policies.  Until  a  coherent,  Community-oriented 
organisation of all these  four  elements  is  found,  the  temptation  is to 
yeild  a  Little on  each,  including  even  the principle of  free  trade, 
thus  calling into question  the  very  foundations  of  the  Community. 
There  is  no  point  in assuming  an  attitude of  moral  or  legalistic 
condemnation  in  the  face  of  such  developments  and  risks :  the  problem 
needs  to  be  tackled,  and  in  this  regard  there  would  seem  to  be  two  broad 
possibiLities. 
•  .• .I  ••• 24 •.  · 
The  first, and  certainly preferable solution,  would  be  to 
realise to  the full  any  one  of  the  three alternatives  examined  above 
either complete  coordination of  policies, or full  capital  market 
intedration or  monetary  union  would  "square the  circle" of  our 
incompatibilities.  There  is  no  need  to  illustrate the  considerable 
difficulties of  arriving at  the  final  destination along  any  one  of 
these  three  roads  :  the  experience  of  the  Community  to  date  is 
unfortunately an  ~loquent and  sufficient  testimony  in  this  regard. 
But  if the  will  to  take  the  important  qualitative  leap  which  is 
involved  were  to materialise,  it would  seem  that  the  way  of  monetary 
union  is still the  one  likely to offer  less  "mechanical"  resistance 
and  the  greater  chances  of  success. 
The  second,  less  satisfactory but  in practice more  probable, 
alternative  is that  of  gradualism.  Here  the  transition from  purely 
national  approaches  to  a  Community-oriented  organisation  is  seen 
as  a  progressive shift  in  a  spectrum,  as  a  gradual  but  nevertheless 
on-going  process.  The  EMS,  for  example,  by  focussing  attention on 
convergence,  may  be  seen  as  a  strategic catalyst  in this process  of 
integration,  enhancing  the  legitimacy of  each  participant's  concern 
for  the others'  policies  and  inducing  Member  States  to discuss 
fundamental  issues  sooner  in  time,  in greater depth  and  in  terms  of 
more  concrete policy options  than  in  the  past.  Barring the great 
leap  forward  to full  Community  coordination or  complete  capital 
market  and  monetary  union,  we  therefore appear  to have  no  choice 
but  to persevere  on  all  three fronts,  taking a  series of  steps, 
Lengthening  our  stride where  possible,  and  gaining  momentum  until 
the  leap  -which  will  then  perhaps  not  have  to  be  so "great"- to 
effective integration will  be  the  natural  and  logic  cutmination 
of  our  efforts  since  the  early sixties. 
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TABLE  1  THE  EARLY  SIXTIES  VERSUS  THE  EARLY  EIGHTIES 
SOME  INDICATORS  FOR  THE  COMMUNITY 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
GOP  volume  growth 
Consumer  prices 
Unemployment  rate 
Net  lending  (+)  or  net  borrowing  (-) 
of  general  government  (%  of  GOP) 
Real  short-term  interest  rates 
Share  of  exports  in  GOP  (%) 
Current  account  balance  (%  of  GOP) 
Cumulative  change  in  ECU/Z  rate 
(1)  Average  1961-65;  and  1980-April  1982. 
1960-1965  I  1980-1982  I 
! 
5.3  0.8 
3.3  12.3 
2.1  7.7 
in  balance  - 4.5 
+ 0.4  (1)  +  2.1  (1) 
18.5  29.5 
+ 0.3  - 0.8 
+ 1.3  (2)  - 28.0  (2) 
i 
(2)  For  1960-65,  change  between  the  two  yearly averages;  for  1980-82,  change 
between  January  1980  and  May  1982  (+  sign  indicates  ECU  appreciation.) 
Sources  :  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  Directora~e-General for 
Economic  and  Financial  Affairs- "European  Economy"  and  "European 
Economy  - Supplement  A - Recent  Economic  Trends",  various  issues; 
and  Commission  staff  internal  calculations. 26
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TABLE  2  GROWTH  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  MARKETS,  1970-1981 
(billions of dollars) 
1970  1975 
i  i 
Eurocurrency  market  estimated  size - Gross  110  460 
Net  65  250 
Eurocurrency  bank  credits, 
1981 
1800 
905 
publicly announced  in period  4.7  21.0  133.4 
New  international  bond  issues  4.6  19.9  53.0 
i  i 
Source  :  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust,  World  Financial  Markets,  various  issues 
p = provisional 
p 
p 